Given that Aberdeen are still so poor, why is there not more criticism of Craig Brown?

When Craig Brown took over as Aberdeen manager in December of last year, he inherited an almighty mess left behind by his predecessor Mark McGhee.  After some initial progress in the second half of the previous campaign, the current Aberdeen manager has now accumulated fewer points than McGhee had at the same stage last season.

This, firstly, raises the question as to why there has been significantly less criticism levelled at Craig Brown, but also why do Aberdeen remain so poor with a supposedly superior manager at the helm?

In most analyses of Aberdeen, it seems it is the players who take most of the blame.  Aberdeen's most recent opponents Hibernian sit one point below the north-east club, yet Colin Calderwood faces criticism from supporters and pundits on almost a daily basis.

After the recent draw away to Hibernian, Brown was questioned about his side’s poor start to the season.  His response was to reference the fact that two of his seven matches – which include a solitary win and two draws – have come against the Old Firm.  Granted, anything taken from these matches can be envisaged as a bonus for most sides in the SPL, however, in the other five matches Aberdeen have played far this season, they have managed a measly two goals, both of which came against fellow strugglers Inverness in their only victory of the SPL campaign so far.

Brown also pointed to “a lack of cohesion, combination-play and fluency” which, he claims, will come once they manage a few favourable results.  This seems to be putting the cart before the horse, however.  Surely attaining the cohesion, combination-play and fluency the former-Scotland manager craves is exactly what is needed to bring about these much needed results?

These are not the only bizarre comments Brown has uttered following a match this season.  In every  post-match interview so far, minus the defeat in Paisley, Brown has claimed that Aberdeen have dominated all or part of the ninety minutes, or else have deserved something from the game.

In fairness, his side were unlucky not to take anything from the match at Ibrox a few weeks ago, but to claim that his side were “totally dominant” at Tynecastle for thirty minutes, and that the scoreline was a distortion, is to embellish their performance that day.

Furthermore, his assertion that Aberdeen had done enough to take a point from their match versus Celtic at Pittodrie is, frankly, delusional.  Not only did they concede 62% possession, they allowed Neil Lennon’s side twenty-five attempts at goal (thirteen on target) to the home side’s six (three on target).

As mentioned earlier, Brown inherited a sorry state of affairs when he was appointed Aberdeen manager.  This includes the personnel available to him as well as squad morale.  What the squad possessed slightly more of then, that they sorely lack now, is width and creativity. 

The likes of Sone Aluko and Chris Maguire, the latter of which is more suited to a central role but showed similar quality when used out wide, provided a link between midfield and attack and Brown used the January transfer window to add David McNamee and Steven Smith, both of whom provided impetus from full-back.

Aluko and Maguire have since moved on whereas McNamee and Smith were not retained for the new season.  Their departures, along with the lack of replacements, have left Aberdeen sorely lacking in these departments.

Richard Foster has returned from his loan spell at Rangers and started the season as the first-choice left-back.  Against Hibernian on Sunday he was pushed up into the left of midfield and was one of the better performers in a dull encounter.

This meant that Aberdeen lined up with four central defenders across their back line – McArdle, Mawene, Arnason, Considine.  Part of Brown’s strategy here was no doubt to benefit from set-piece opportunities and in theory this should have worked, however, they failed to test the Hibernian rearguard from ten corner kick attempts.

In a few of the matches where Foster has been deployed at left-back, Brown has gone with four central midfielders in a narrow 4-4-2 formation - in the 3-0 defeat to Hearts for example - using two holding midfielders – Isaac Osbourne and Kari Arnason - and two more creative players - Robert Milsom and Fraser Fyvie – on either side.

This system failed to bring about many clear-cut chances, never mind goals, amplified by the lack of an overlap or any sort of width from the full-backs.  Rory McArdle rarely gets forward from right-back and Foster, naturally a right-sided player, always looks to cut on to his stronger foot, rendering any overlap ineffective, or at best partially effective.

Moreover, Milsom displayed against Hibernian that he is more valuable when used in the centre and able to drop deep and collect the ball from the centre backs, while Fyvie is also more naturally a central midfielder. 

In an attempt to address this issue, Fyvie has since been moved to just off Scott Vernon as a second striker, but a lot of hope seems to have been pinned on the eighteen-year-old this season, who recently recovered from a cruciate injury that sidelined him for around nine months.

The young midfielder put in an exciting performance in the season opener versus St. Johnstone but has failed to replicate this in subsequent matches.  Since being moved into a more advanced position, his role now seems to involve getting on the end of knock-downs from Vernon, rather than getting on the ball and causing opposition defenders problems.

There are several other examples of players being used out-of-position.  Striker Josh Magennis and central-midfielder Ryan Jack have been experimented with on the flanks, while the latter has also been used at right-back.  Andrew Considine, naturally a central-defender, found himself positioned at left-back in the match versus Hibernian.

Chris Clark was the latest to be used in a wide-midfield role, also versus Hibernian.  He is versatile enough to play anywhere across the midfield – he is also adept at left-back in the past – but doesn’t possess the attributes of a winger and, therefore, doesn’t seem to be the man to solve Aberdeen’s problem when used out wide.

The only natural winger in the first-team squad is Peter Pawlett but his performances haven’t quite been up to scratch and his manager seems reluctant to give him an extended run in the first team.

Craig Brown has now been in charge of the club during two transfer windows but seems to have failed in acquiring the necessary personnel to provide support for his striker(s).  Scott Vernon showed last season that he can score goals, managing a total of fifteen in all competitions, but has only netted once so far this campaign.

There is no doubting the defensive instincts of Craig Brown - evidenced by four centre-backs being deployed across the defence, instructing his side to sit deep and hit the forwards with long balls, and the narrow nature of most of his line ups - but even given the players now at his disposal, is there a solution to the problems currently facing this impotent Aberdeen squad?

Perhaps moving back to the narrow 4-4-2 used at Tynecastle wouldn’t be such a bad idea now that Clark has returned from injury.  Clark pushing on from left-back with Foster doing the same in his more natural right-back role would, in theory, provide the side with the necessary width required to allow Milsom and Fyvie to occupy central areas between the holding midfielders and strikers.

The use of two holders – say, Arnason and Osbourne – just ahead of the back four would offer adequate protection and cover for the meandering full-backs and would not leave the central defensive pair exposed.

The final benefit of such a system is that it would allow Brown to go with a strike partnership:  It is questionable whether Vernon is able to play up front on his own and the pace of Magennis or Darren Mackie, despite their terrible recent scoring records, would surely benefit the English striker.

This is, of course, all theory and the application of this would no doubt raise its own problems.  Nonetheless, Brown better find a solution quickly or else he will find attendances dwindle even further at Pittordrie and see his battling at the wrong end of the table once again.

Can Celtic stick with the same system without Izaguirre?

Last season, Neil Lennon favoured a lopsided 4-4-2 with Kris Commons pushed ahead of what were essentially three central midfielders.  Either Scott Brown or Joe Ledley would inhabit a more reserved and tucked in role on the opposite flank to Commons.  Moreover, Commons would look to drift inside and occupy the space between the opposition defence and midfield.

The narrow nature of the Celtic midfield was compensated for by the advancement of marauding full-backs, Mark Wilson and Emilio Izaguirre.  At one point last season, both would push up the pitch as much as possible – the 2-2 draw in the Scottish Cup at Ibrox last season is a prime example, even if the initial formation in that match differed from the lopsided 4-4-2 – but towards the end of the season, Wilson’s impetus from right-back dissipated somewhat.

4-4-2, and three-band formations more generally, have gone out of fashion with top sides in the past decade, with many clubs now favouring 4-2-3-1, 4-2-1-3 and the like.  The position of Commons, along with the front two dovetailing in Lennon’s 4-4-2, gives the formation an implicit fourth band.

This particular deployment of 4-4-2 is nothing new.  Kenny Dalglish employed something similar during his first spell as Liverpool manager, and again when manager of Celtic for a brief spell.  As pointed out in the embedded article, fielding two out-and-out wingers in a 4-4-2 can be a risky strategy and Lennon himself has resisted such a move on all but a few occasions.

The system has been effective for a few reasons.  Firstly, it permits three central midfielders in the line up and, given the quality that Celtic possess in that area of the pitch, allows them to dominate most midfield duos and trios they come up against.

Now with the full-backs pushing on to offer width and Commons given free rein to drift ahead of the midfield, the system permits Lennon to field a strike partnership.

In an article spelling out the demise of the classic goalpoacher, Jonathan Wilson points out that due to the rise of lone-striker systems, top strikers are now expected to blend classic strike partnerships into a hybrid role – be it a Didier Drogba that fuses the target man and finisher roles, or a David Villa that combines the best of the creator and finisher responsibilities.

Unfortunately, in Scottish football there is a dearth of these types of strikers.  Nikica Jelavic is one exception and the reason why Rangers will sometimes line up with a lone striker system.  Garry O’Connor is another who blurs the target man/finisher boundaries but his quality his waned somewhat since his last spell at Easter Road.

It is no surprise then, that given the lack of this type and quality of striker, that some clubs in the SPL still favour a 4-4-2.  David Goodwillie was a further example in Scottish football of a creator-finisher hybrid before his recent transfer to Blackburn Rovers, but his departure has seen Peter Houston move from a lone-striker system to a front pairing of Jon Daly and Johnny Russell (or, more recently, Russell and Lauri Dalla Valle).

Without doubt, Antony Stokes and Gary Hooper are two of the top strikers in the league and are arguably the best partnership.  Their link-up play and mutual understanding have seen them terrorise many an SPL defence.  However, neither is suited to playing as the sole striker.  Instead, Lennon has tended to favour Georgios Samaras when the need to go with one striker arises.

Lennon did experiment with Hooper spearheading a 4-2-3-1 in the recent win over Aberdeen but soon realised its shortcomings due to the personnel at his disposal and quickly switching back to his more familiar 4-4-2.  Stokes looks uncomfortable pushed out wide and the knock-on effect is that Hooper becomes isolated.

To sum up, the main benefit of Lennon’s formation is that it allows for a strike partnership without allowing other sides a man advantage, or else allows Celtic to retain a man advantage, in the centre of midfield.  Further, the personnel at his disposal rules out any lone striker system, although, admittedly, I know very little about new signing Mohamed Bangura.

The success of the formation last season – Celtic didn’t win the SPL but they amassed a points total worthy of it most other years, won the Scottish Cup and played some of the best football in the SPL – was partly down to the attacking prowess of Izaguirre and the loss of the Honduran to long-term injury has had an adverse affect on the effectiveness of Lennon’s system.

Lennon has since deployed Charlie Mulgrew at left-back.  The former Aberdeen defender is comfortable on the ball and possesses a great delivery but lacks the pace and drive that Izaguirre provides.  His more reserved approach to that of the Honduran may go some way to explaining why Commons has been less valuable so far this season.  More specifically, there is no one bombing beyond him and giving opposition full-backs a dilemma.

Alternatively, Lennon could move one of his right-backs, most likely Mark Wilson or Adam Matthews, over to the left.  The problem with this approach is that the overlap would thus become less of a danger to opposition defenders since Wilson or Matthews would find themselves having to cross with their weaker foot or else cut inside on to their stronger side.

Either way, Celtic will miss the attacking threat from left-back that Izaguirre provides.  Subsequently, it seems that Celtic are now inviting pressure upon themselves down the flanks.  Tic_Tac_Tic reports that the Dundee United full-backs took advantage of the space afforded to them by the Celtic midfield, which left Wilson and Mulgrew exposed.

Either Celtic need to switch to a formation that allows more width from midfield or else look to Adam Matthews or Cha Du-Ri to provide from the right what Izaguirre managed from the left last season.  Cha didn’t exactly inspire in the recent win over St. Mirren and although Matthews comes with glowing reports from south of the border, he is still a teenager and has only started two competitive matches this season.

Wilson, the other option at right-back, has fallen out of favour at Celtic Park recently and, as mentioned earlier, doesn’t get forward as much as he did at certain points last season.

So what next for Neil Lennon’s Celtic?  Most of their performances this season have been uninspiring and it appears that their formation has lost much of its effectiveness which, it is argued here, is largely down to the loss of Izaguirre and its knock-on effects.

As I write, however, it is transfer deadline day.  Celtic could recruit a left-back before the day is out, even if the signing of Dundee United’s Paul Dixon now seems unlikely.  If Lennon fails in his bid to bring in an attacking left-back, he will have to tinker with his formation in order to compensate for the loss of the width and drive that Izaguirre provided from that position last season.

Or perhaps Bangura will be the man that allows him to deploy a lone striker system and introduce two wingers to his starting line up.

Rangers 1 Maribor 1 (2-3 on aggregate)

Rangers huffed and puffed against a mediocre Maribor side but failed to take enough of their chances to progress.  Maribor sat behind the ball for most of the ninety minutes and hit Rangers with a sucker-punch early in the second half, which proved decisive in the outcome of the tie.

Ally McCoist was without Lee McCulloch, Davie Weir, Sasa Papac, Jordan McMillan and Kyle Bartley through injury, and was also missing Steven Naismith and Steven Whittaker through suspension.  As well as this, Ross Perry was named on the bench, meaning that Carlos Bocanegra, Maurice Edu and Kirk Broadfoot were restored to the starting line up as McCoist demonstrated his desire to field experience over youth.  They lined up in their usual 4-4-1-1 formation.

Maribor made one change from the 2-1 victory in Slovenia, Ales Mejac missed out and was replaced by Nejc Potokar at right-back.  They lined up in a 4-4-2 formation with Zelko Filipovic sitting just ahead of the back four and Dalibor Volas dropping off Rober Beric in attack.  When in possession, the wide men of Maribor would come inside – like Villarreal’s interiores – and overload the central areas.

With a first-leg lead to protect, it was no surprise that Maribor’s strategy was to sit as many men behind the ball as possible while refusing to pressure their opponents unless they moved past the halfway line.

Rangers, on the other hand, looked to pass the ball out from the back – in a similar fashion to the win in Inverness – with Steven Davis the player dropping to collect the ball from the centre-backs.  And just like that match in the Highlands, Rangers lacked a cutting edge in front of goal

Their approach was to get Gregg Wylde on the ball as much as possible and two of his crosses in the first twenty minutes should have been converted.  Kyle Lafferty failed to commit himself to the first in the seventh minute, and Edu later sent his free header straight into the arms of Jasmin Handanovic.

Added to this, Rangers enjoyed a succession of corners but failed to take advantage of Maribor’s vulnerability in these situations.

Rangers’ injury woes were added to when Perry replaced Lee Wallace around five minutes before half-time.  The enforced change meant that Bocanegra was moved to the left-back and from that point on, Rangers missed the thrust Wallace had provided from that position and, relatedly, the support and overlap for Wylde.

Nikica Jelavic and Lafferty dovetailed throughout the first half, linked up well at times and between them created another two excellent opportunities that Lafferty squandered, one of which was a one-on-one with the goalkeeper on the stroke of half-time.

Second half

Whereas most of Rangers’ play in the first half was focused through Wylde on the left, two chances early in the second half were created down the right, both involving Kirk Broadfoot, which Lafferty and Davis failed to trouble Handanovic with.

Rangers were then made to regret their missed chances when Volas opened the scoring on fifty-five minutes. 

The few times Maribor found themselves in possession in advanced positions, their most dangerous player was Dejan Mezga – one of the interiors – who would start wide, drift inside to collect the ball and beat players.  He was fed half way inside the Rangers half and managed to draw three Rangers players towards him before slipping the ball to Aleds Mertelj.  The twenty-four year old then took advantage of the space afforded to him by the holdup play of Mezga and drove at the Rangers defence before finding Volas, who finished in the bottom corner.

If Maribor were not ultra-defensive before, a 1-0 lead (and 3-1 aggregate lead) meant that they were now, and with as many time-wasting tactics as possible thrown in.

Rangers panicked for a short spell but then soon settled into their passing that had brought about many opportunities until then.

One player who had been largely ineffective was Juan Manuel Ortiz and he was replaced by David Healy with just over twenty-minutes remaining.  Lafferty was moved out to the right but increasingly found himself in central positions alongside Jelavic and Healy as the match entered its final stages.

Rangers did manage to pull a goal back, when Bocanegra bundled in a Wylde corner, but a late rally couldn’t save their European blushes.  This time, of the chances created, Healy was the most culpable as he displayed a severe lack of composure when one-on-one with Handanovic.

Conclusion

McCoist’s tactics are hard to argue with: His side created enough chances to win two or three Europa League ties, they just failed to take them.

Rangers looked to get the ball wide to Wylde and hit their two large strikers with early crosses.  As well as this, Lafferty and Jelavic would take turns to drop deep and wide, link play and draw defenders out of position.

All this worked, it was the finishing that let them down.

In saying that, it wasn’t the most interesting match tactically.  Maribor sat ten men behind the ball in attempt to stifle Rangers.  It didn’t work as Rangers carved out several clear-cut opportunities.  Their Euro exit must be blamed on poor finishing, rather than a fantastic defensive performance from Maribor.