Hearts 0 Rangers 2

Rangers put in another excellent defensive display away from home and continued their remarkable run of six wins from six on the road, scoring fourteen and failing to concede in the process.  It was a rather drab performance from Hearts, although they could have levelled at 1-0 had the ball fallen to a more composed striker of the ball than Adrian Mrowiec midway through the second half.

Ally McCoist changed the shape of his side for this visit to Tynecastle, ditching his usual 4-4-2 in favour of a 4-4-1-1, which matched Hearts man-for-man in the centre of the pitch - something Neil Lennon failed to execute in Celtic’s recent defeat at the same ground.

Another notable feature of the Rangers formation saw two left-backs start on the left – Sasa Papac was deployed at left-midfield – and Maurice Edu moved out to the right of midfield.  Hearts have gained a fair amount of success from their advancing full-backs this season and the use of two defensive-minded players as their direct opponents, as well as a three-man central midfield, displayed McCoist’s willingness to prioritise stopping his opponents from playing.

There was little to note about the Hearts formation.  For the third successive match, Paulo Sergio fielded the same starting eleven in a 4-3-3 formation.

Scrappy first half

Hearts dominated the early stages of a first half more noteworthy for its stop-start nature and cynical fouls than any football on display.  Steven Whittaker picked up an early booking and was perhaps lucky to stay on the pitch after a late foul on David Templeton.

This came after he had helped his side take the lead, however.  The former Hibernian full-back collected the ball from Edu around the halfway line and drove towards the Hearts penalty area.  He evaded the challenge, or lack thereof, from no fewer than four Hearts players before feeding Steven Naismith, who struck the ball through the legs of the advancing Marian Kello.

Naismith started the match just off Kyle Lafferty in attack and was a handful for the Hearts defence all afternoon through his movement and intelligent off-the-ball runs.  Eggert Jonsson was the man tasked with man-marking the Scotland international but, for the goal, allowed him to slip free when attempting to stop the run of Whittaker.  Naismith darted into space and finished for his eighth of the season, taking him to the top of the scoring charts.

Hearts then finished the half the stronger side, as they had started the match, but failed to trouble Alan McGregor in the Rangers goal, with the exception of a long-range Rudi Skacel effort.  Rangers, as they have done for many of their away matches this season, sat on their lead and attempted to hit their opponents on the counter attack.

Second half

Rangers’ focus was to get as many men behind the ball as possible for the vast majority of the second half, allowing Hearts plenty of possession.  Hearts managed to carve out two great opportunities – one at 1-0, another at 2-0 – but for all their possession they, for the most part, struggled to break Rangers down.

The main reason for this, mentioned earlier, was the set up of the Rangers side.  Hearts had little joy down the flanks due to the presence of Edu and Papac as auxiliary wide-midfielders.  The Hearts full-backs rarely threatened in advanced areas and both had poor matches, especially Danny Grainger.

Further to this, Hearts were denied space in the centre of the pitch and were rarely able to work the ball through central areas.  Sergio waited until almost eighty minutes had elapsed before making a substitution, sending on Mehdi Taouil for Jonsson.  Taouil is the type of player that can take the ball into feet and find a pass or take the ball past opponents when space is at a premium and it is a change the Hearts manager maybe should have considered making much earlier in the match.

A final reason for the poor performance was the decision-making of some of the Hearts players.  They often elected to play a long ball, a long diagonal pass or a switch of play when there was often a much simpler, shorter passing option available.  On several occasions a Hearts player would make themselves available for a pass in the centre of the pitch yet were ignored.  The Hearts full-backs were particularly guilty of this and Skacel was one player who became visibly frustrated with his teammates.

This is not to take anything away from the Rangers performance.   Knowing the recent form of Hearts at Tynecastle, McCoist intelligently set up his side to stop their opponents and made the right changes at the right time.

After a spell where Hearts greatly dominated possession, McCoist responded by sending on Nikica Jelavic and Gregg Wylde for Lafferty and Papac.  Not only did this produce a goal within three minutes – Carlos Bocanegra picking out Jelavic with a ball over the top of the Hearts defence – it gave Rangers two extra players to target in the final third that could keep the ball in advanced areas something Lafferty had failed to do in his seventy-odd minutes on the pitch.

Conclusion

Without doubt, McCoist won the tactical battle from start to finish.  Stopping the Hearts full-backs from influencing the game and matching the home side man-for-man in the centre of midfield meant Hearts were largely ineffective and, with players like Naismith in attack always likely to finish one of his side’s chances, it culminated in a very efficient performance from the champions.

Hearts shouldn’t be too discouraged from their performance.  Even though they didn’t create much and were woeful in front of goal when they did, they were simply defeated by a better side with a better strategy.  The one worrying thing from a Hearts point of view was their manager’s lack of a plan B and hesitancy in making changes earlier.

Kilmarnock 1 St. Johnstone 2

For the second match in a row, Kenny Shiels lined up his side with a three man defence flanked by two wing-backs.  James Fowler and Gary Fisher were deployed as holding midfielders with Dean Shiels and James Dayton just behind Paul Heffernan in attack.  Shiels made two changes to the defeat at Ibrox.  Liam Kelly was out and replaced by Alex Pursehouse, while Gary Harkins was dropped to the bench in favour of Dayton.

St. Johnstone kept their familiar 4-4-2 shape and also made two changes from their previous fixture.  David McCracken was missing so Callum Davidson came in at left back.  This meant that Alan Maybury was moved to right-back and Dave Mackay to the centre.  The other change saw David Robertson preferred to Chris Millar in midfield.

The first twenty minutes were largely uneventful as the two formations cancelled each other out.  A look at the formations from the image above shows that each side had a spare man at the back – Kilmarnock enjoyed a 3v2, St. Johnstone a 4v3 – and a band of four across the middle.  In a 3-5-2, the main advantage of playing three central defenders, assuming the opposition are playing 4-4-2, is to provide a man advantage in the centre of midfield.

Unfortunately for Kilmarnock, the advanced nature of Dayton and Shiels in the 3-4-3 meant that they lined up man-for-man in the centre of the pitch and enjoyed no such advantage.

St. Johnstone’s solid rearguard

St. Johnstone’s defending was another factor of Kilmarnock’s shortage of chances in the opening stages.  Heffernan has shown himself to be a real goal-threat this season but struggled to find much space in this match – apart from one occasion where he worked the space himself by a quick turn on the ball, taking two defenders out of the play.  The St. Johnstone back four defended very narrow, meaning that the two centre-backs were able to stay close together and deny Heffernan space.

Moreover, if Dayton or Shiels collected the ball in the final third, one of the St. Johnstone defenders would come to meet them, allowing the other three to hold the defensive line and not be overmanned.  As well as this, Liam Craig and David Robertson would track the forward runs of the Kilmarnock wing-backs.  It was a very assured defensive display from Derek McInnes’s men.

Both sides attempted to patiently build from the back where possible but it was St. Johnstone who were more comfortable in doing this.  On several occasions, the Kilmarnock defenders were put under pressure after a stray pass, but their manager insisted post-match that his side will persist with this strategy regardless.

Another notable feature of the match was the lack of pressing in midfield.  Both sides’ central midfielders stood off their direct opponents and it was this lack of pressing that led to the opening goal.

Jody Morris and Robertson were allowed to easily work the ball through midfield before Robertson turned and fed Francisco Sandaza.  Manuel Pascali dived in, missing the ball and allowing Sandaza a clear run at goal, and the Spaniard again showed his potency in front of goal, scoring his sixth goal of the season.

St. Johnstone’s strategy once taking the lead is usually to keep things tight but as the half wore on they began to commit more men forward than they had at 0-0.  One of these attacks led to a scrappy counter-attack which resulted in a Kilmarnock corner from which they equalised.

By this point the momentum had swung the way of the home side, but despite this, St. Johnstone were unlucky to see the ball ricochet off their own player and into the back of the net.  

Second half

The second half continued in a similar vein to how the first half had ended with Kilmarnock on the ascendency.  Heffernan continued to struggle to find space on the shoulder of the last defender and began to drop off the St. Johnstone back-line and link with the midfield.  Kilmarnock enjoyed a spell where they worked some intricate passing moves around the edge of the box, while Heffernan saw his deflected effort saved well by Peter Enckelman.

Derek McInnes responded by withdrawing Kevin Moon for Chris Millar, a like-for-like swap which improved his side’s ball-retention in the middle of the park.

St. Johnstone were ahead again when Cillian Sheridan rounded Cammy Bell in the Kilmarnock goal to net the winner.  In almost a carbon copy of their second at home to Hearts last week, a long punt from Enckelman was pounced upon by Sandaza after some defensive hesitancy, and he reacted quickly to send Sheridan through on goal.

It was another well created and taken goal from the St. Johnstone front two but a poor one to lose from a Kilmarnock perspective.  Mohamed Sissoko’s poor attempt at controlling the ball, as opposed to a safety-first approach, allowed the pace of Sheridan to once again exploit a high defensive line and it proved to be decisive.

Kenny Shiels introduced Danny Racchi, and latterly William Gros, to the play, moving into a 4-4-2/4-2-4 formation but, with St. Johnstone now sitting very deep – Sheridan and Sandaza were even coming into their own half to close down – they struggled to work the ball into an area where they could pass or cross the ball into the box, let alone create chances.

Conclusion

For the second match in-a-row, Kenny Shiels lined his side up in a 3-4-3 formation.  On both occasions they have been up against a 4-4-2 and on both occasions they have lost.  Their failing, seems not to be in their shape but the ease at which they concede possession.

Derek McInnes’s side are not overly-defensive or negative, they are just one of the better sides in the league at defending.  They held firm but for an own-goal conceded from a set-piece.  Their impressive defence was evident last season; they have now added clinicalness in front of goal to it.

Hearts 2 Celtic 0

After an inept performance versus St. Johnstone last week, Hearts were always likely to make changes.  Mehdi Taouil, David Obua and Stephen Elliott dropped out with Rudi Skacel, Eggert Jonsson and David Templeton starting.  Paulo Sergio stuck to his usual 4-3-3 formation but moved Ryan Stevenson into a lone-striking position.  The other significant difference was to move Adrian Mrowiec slightly further forward, using Jonsson as the deepest of the midfield three, but more on that below.

With Joe Ledley, Bream Kayal and Scott Brown unavailable, Neil Lennon was forced into a 4-4-2 with two out-and-out wingers.  Kris Commons returned to the starting line up and Badr El-Kaddouri came in at left-back.  Fraser Forster replaced Lukas Zaluska in goals.

The pros and cons of Lennon’s 4-4-2

Whether out of design or necessity, Lennon’s decision to field Commons and James Forrest brought about a degree of tactical success.  Danny Grainger and Jamie Hamill have thus far been effective at getting forward and putting dangerous balls into the box and, given Celtic’s vulnerability from crosses, their being pinned back negated that threat to a certain extent.

The knock-on effect was a shortfall in the centre of midfield.  Sergio decided to go with three defensive-minded midfielders and instructed Ian Black and Mrowiec to press the Celtic central midfield.  This left Jonsson as a spare man to sweep up in front of the defence, which was effective for the most part.

Victor Wanyama had a very good first half, both with and without possession, but the Hearts tactics stopped his partner Ki Sung-Yeung from getting on the ball and dictating play.  A further consequence was the supply to Gary Hooper was cut.  Hooper thrives on through balls and linking up with his strike partner but he grew increasingly frustrated with his lack of time on the ball.

The first half was pretty even, with both sides creating a few chances, the best of which fell to Mohamed Bangura.  Forrest collected the ball after a poor defensive header from Grainger and sent in a delightful cross but the Sierra Leone striker’s header was pushed around the post by Jamie MacDonald.

Hearts’ strategy

Much has been made about Paulo Sergio’s change in style since he took over as manager, but any attempt to patiently build from the back was, at least temporarily, abandoned as Hearts looked to move the ball quickly to Skacel and Templeton.

John Sutton was again left out, however, Stevenson was deployed as the lone-striker, perhaps a sign of the new manager conceding that a physical presence is required in attack.  The Hearts back line and goalkeeper was not as averse to hitting long, direct passes up towards him.

Hearts’ play was less laboured, less predictable and, most significantly, more effective.  Their decision to vary their play more meant that they enjoyed more time in and around their opponent’s penalty area than last week. 

Second half

The second half began with a sustained period of pressure from the away side, forcing MacDonald into another couple of saves.  Then, against the run of play, Hearts took the lead on fifty-eight minutes.

Skacel was about to be substituted when he fired a low strike across Forster and into the net.  Celtic’s main weakness this season has been their inability to defend crosses and again they failed to deal with one here.

The cross in question hung in the air, giving the Celtic defence plenty of time to react, but Daniel Majstorovic again displayed his indecisiveness by failing to attack it.  Templeton cushioned the ball, laying it off in the same movement, for Skacel to finish.

Lennon reacted immediately by withdrawing Bangura for Antony Stokes, a switch he may have made regardless, but the Irish international was given little time to make an impact before his side were reduced to ten men.

His manager had revealed before the match that Commons may not last the ninety minutes but surely he didn’t mean it in this sense.  In stark contrast to last season, Commons has so far had a torrid campaign and there was only ever going to be one outcome after his reckless lunge on Mrowiec.

Celtic then moved to a 4-2-1-2 formation, with Forrest in behind Stokes and Hooper, and continued to enjoy the majority of the possession.  El-Kaddouri was then removed and replaced with Paddy McCourt as Celtic switched to a back three, but they failed to break Hearts down.

Sergio’s response to the red card was to move to a 4-4-2/4-4-1-1formation – Ian Black moved to right-midfield with Skacel just off Stevenson – and attempt to defend the lead.  A risky move considering the danger that Celtic still possessed.  It paid off, however, as Hearts grabbed a second goal on the counter.

A long ball from Grainger was chased down by Templeton and his clever back-heel was collected by Stevenson, who remained composed before finishing. 

Conclusion

There was much tactical interest and plenty of excitement in this encounter.  Neil Lennon may have been forced into a 4-4-2 with two wingers but it helped in nullifying the threat of the Hearts full-backs.

This led to a shortfall in the centre of park which worked to Hearts’ advantage.  Paulo Sergio decided to field three battlers in central midfield and this denied Ki time and space, which he finds and exploits in most matches, ultimately cutting the supply to the strikers.  Celtic’s failing, other than the red card, was again an inability to deal with crosses.

Sergio abandoned his patient pass-from-the-back approach in favour of a quicker, more direct strategy and it suited his side.  The interest, going forward, will lie in whether or not he continues with this approach in future matches, at least until he has the players to do otherwise.

Given that Aberdeen are still so poor, why is there not more criticism of Craig Brown?

When Craig Brown took over as Aberdeen manager in December of last year, he inherited an almighty mess left behind by his predecessor Mark McGhee.  After some initial progress in the second half of the previous campaign, the current Aberdeen manager has now accumulated fewer points than McGhee had at the same stage last season.

This, firstly, raises the question as to why there has been significantly less criticism levelled at Craig Brown, but also why do Aberdeen remain so poor with a supposedly superior manager at the helm?

In most analyses of Aberdeen, it seems it is the players who take most of the blame.  Aberdeen's most recent opponents Hibernian sit one point below the north-east club, yet Colin Calderwood faces criticism from supporters and pundits on almost a daily basis.

After the recent draw away to Hibernian, Brown was questioned about his side’s poor start to the season.  His response was to reference the fact that two of his seven matches – which include a solitary win and two draws – have come against the Old Firm.  Granted, anything taken from these matches can be envisaged as a bonus for most sides in the SPL, however, in the other five matches Aberdeen have played far this season, they have managed a measly two goals, both of which came against fellow strugglers Inverness in their only victory of the SPL campaign so far.

Brown also pointed to “a lack of cohesion, combination-play and fluency” which, he claims, will come once they manage a few favourable results.  This seems to be putting the cart before the horse, however.  Surely attaining the cohesion, combination-play and fluency the former-Scotland manager craves is exactly what is needed to bring about these much needed results?

These are not the only bizarre comments Brown has uttered following a match this season.  In every  post-match interview so far, minus the defeat in Paisley, Brown has claimed that Aberdeen have dominated all or part of the ninety minutes, or else have deserved something from the game.

In fairness, his side were unlucky not to take anything from the match at Ibrox a few weeks ago, but to claim that his side were “totally dominant” at Tynecastle for thirty minutes, and that the scoreline was a distortion, is to embellish their performance that day.

Furthermore, his assertion that Aberdeen had done enough to take a point from their match versus Celtic at Pittodrie is, frankly, delusional.  Not only did they concede 62% possession, they allowed Neil Lennon’s side twenty-five attempts at goal (thirteen on target) to the home side’s six (three on target).

As mentioned earlier, Brown inherited a sorry state of affairs when he was appointed Aberdeen manager.  This includes the personnel available to him as well as squad morale.  What the squad possessed slightly more of then, that they sorely lack now, is width and creativity. 

The likes of Sone Aluko and Chris Maguire, the latter of which is more suited to a central role but showed similar quality when used out wide, provided a link between midfield and attack and Brown used the January transfer window to add David McNamee and Steven Smith, both of whom provided impetus from full-back.

Aluko and Maguire have since moved on whereas McNamee and Smith were not retained for the new season.  Their departures, along with the lack of replacements, have left Aberdeen sorely lacking in these departments.

Richard Foster has returned from his loan spell at Rangers and started the season as the first-choice left-back.  Against Hibernian on Sunday he was pushed up into the left of midfield and was one of the better performers in a dull encounter.

This meant that Aberdeen lined up with four central defenders across their back line – McArdle, Mawene, Arnason, Considine.  Part of Brown’s strategy here was no doubt to benefit from set-piece opportunities and in theory this should have worked, however, they failed to test the Hibernian rearguard from ten corner kick attempts.

In a few of the matches where Foster has been deployed at left-back, Brown has gone with four central midfielders in a narrow 4-4-2 formation - in the 3-0 defeat to Hearts for example - using two holding midfielders – Isaac Osbourne and Kari Arnason - and two more creative players - Robert Milsom and Fraser Fyvie – on either side.

This system failed to bring about many clear-cut chances, never mind goals, amplified by the lack of an overlap or any sort of width from the full-backs.  Rory McArdle rarely gets forward from right-back and Foster, naturally a right-sided player, always looks to cut on to his stronger foot, rendering any overlap ineffective, or at best partially effective.

Moreover, Milsom displayed against Hibernian that he is more valuable when used in the centre and able to drop deep and collect the ball from the centre backs, while Fyvie is also more naturally a central midfielder. 

In an attempt to address this issue, Fyvie has since been moved to just off Scott Vernon as a second striker, but a lot of hope seems to have been pinned on the eighteen-year-old this season, who recently recovered from a cruciate injury that sidelined him for around nine months.

The young midfielder put in an exciting performance in the season opener versus St. Johnstone but has failed to replicate this in subsequent matches.  Since being moved into a more advanced position, his role now seems to involve getting on the end of knock-downs from Vernon, rather than getting on the ball and causing opposition defenders problems.

There are several other examples of players being used out-of-position.  Striker Josh Magennis and central-midfielder Ryan Jack have been experimented with on the flanks, while the latter has also been used at right-back.  Andrew Considine, naturally a central-defender, found himself positioned at left-back in the match versus Hibernian.

Chris Clark was the latest to be used in a wide-midfield role, also versus Hibernian.  He is versatile enough to play anywhere across the midfield – he is also adept at left-back in the past – but doesn’t possess the attributes of a winger and, therefore, doesn’t seem to be the man to solve Aberdeen’s problem when used out wide.

The only natural winger in the first-team squad is Peter Pawlett but his performances haven’t quite been up to scratch and his manager seems reluctant to give him an extended run in the first team.

Craig Brown has now been in charge of the club during two transfer windows but seems to have failed in acquiring the necessary personnel to provide support for his striker(s).  Scott Vernon showed last season that he can score goals, managing a total of fifteen in all competitions, but has only netted once so far this campaign.

There is no doubting the defensive instincts of Craig Brown - evidenced by four centre-backs being deployed across the defence, instructing his side to sit deep and hit the forwards with long balls, and the narrow nature of most of his line ups - but even given the players now at his disposal, is there a solution to the problems currently facing this impotent Aberdeen squad?

Perhaps moving back to the narrow 4-4-2 used at Tynecastle wouldn’t be such a bad idea now that Clark has returned from injury.  Clark pushing on from left-back with Foster doing the same in his more natural right-back role would, in theory, provide the side with the necessary width required to allow Milsom and Fyvie to occupy central areas between the holding midfielders and strikers.

The use of two holders – say, Arnason and Osbourne – just ahead of the back four would offer adequate protection and cover for the meandering full-backs and would not leave the central defensive pair exposed.

The final benefit of such a system is that it would allow Brown to go with a strike partnership:  It is questionable whether Vernon is able to play up front on his own and the pace of Magennis or Darren Mackie, despite their terrible recent scoring records, would surely benefit the English striker.

This is, of course, all theory and the application of this would no doubt raise its own problems.  Nonetheless, Brown better find a solution quickly or else he will find attendances dwindle even further at Pittordrie and see his battling at the wrong end of the table once again.

Dundee United 0 Rangers 1

Peter Houston was missing Sean Dillon through injury and replaced him at right-back with Keith Watson.  He made two other changes from the 3-3 draw with St. Johnstone, replacing Barry Douglas and Stuart Armstrong with Scott Robertson and Danny Swanson.  They lined up 4-3-3 with a very fluid central midfield three.  Robertson moved from side-to-side across the pitch with Willo Flood and John Rankin taking turns to burst forward from midfield.

Ally McCoist was without Nikica Jelavic - the striker was injured whilst on international duty with Croatia - and Ross Perry was dropped to the bench which meant that Steven Whittaker and Juan Manuel Ortiz were restored to the starting line up, also in a 4-3-3 formation.  Steven Naismith was deployed in a deeper central midfield role than usual with Maurice Edu patrolling in front of the back four.  Edu actually had one of his better matches in a Rangers shirt, winning the ball well on several occasions and playing simple sideways passes.

The match took a while to settle in a very expansive first half.  Rangers were more attacking than they have been in recent away matches but struggled to make the ball stick in attacking areas, while Dundee United looked threatening from set-pieces and shots from just outside the box.

Dundee United’s formation from middle to front was very fluid.  The middle three have already been mentioned above and, added to this, Swanson would look to cut into the centre of the pitch as often as possible while Jonny Russell regularly moved towards the lone striker Lauri Dalla Valle to offer support.  Dalla Valle himself would look to drop deep and link play.

Russell red card

Rangers were handed a man advantage when Russell stupidly aimed a headbutt towards Kirk Broadfoot.  The ordering off saw Swanson moved over to the right and Rankin pushed out to the right in a 4-4-1 formation.

The consequence was that the Rangers midfield now had much more time on the ball and space to exploit as their Dundee United counterparts chose to now standoff, as opposed to pressurising, them.  As well as this, Steven Naismith was pushed into a more advanced position, meaning the Rangers formation now resembled more of a 4-2-3-1.

Rangers almost capitalised when Edu scooped a delightful ball over the top for Naismith to run on to.  He controlled well but failed to steer his strike on target.

Perhaps surprisingly, Dundee United finished the half the stronger of the sides, choosing to press their opponents more as the half came to a close, and should have taken the lead from another set-piece opportunity.

Second half

Peter Houston sent his side out in a 4-5-0, more precisely 4-3-2-0, at the start of the second half with the original central midfield three restored.  Dalla Valle and Swanson were fielded wide but were given free rein to drift infield and across the attacking areas.

United now matched Rangers man-for-man in the centre of midfield once more and had wide men tracking back but, counterintuitively, conceded three chances in quick succession early in the second half, more than they had in the fifteen minutes they played with only two players in central midfield.

The home side had failed to create anything resembling a chance in this time and responded with another change in formation.  A few minutes before Rangers took the lead, Houston moved Dalla Valle back into a striking role with Swanson just behind in a 4-3-1-1 formation.  Swanson now looked to drop deep and collect the ball before launching attacks.

This left United vulnerable down the flanks, especially with the Rangers full-backs pushing on and it was no surprise that the Rangers goal came from a delivery from a wide area.

Gregg Wylde had stayed on the right side of the pitch following the breakdown of a corner and received the ball from Whittaker after he surged forward from the halfway line.  The young winger cut onto his left foot and sent a wonderful inswinging cross from deep.  Kyle Lafferty got in behind Watson before powering a header past the hapless Dusan Pernis.

It was the first, and only, good delivery Wylde managed in the entire match and must have persuaded his manager to at least consider deploying him on this side.  On the left he has the pace to beat most full-backs he comes up against, however, at speed he seems to lack the composure to pick out a teammate in the box.  Further, inswinging crosses seem to carry more of a threat when fired into the danger area.

Dundee United brought on the impressive Ryan Dow for Dalla Valle and pushed further up the pitch in an attempt to salvage something from the match.  They came close late on when a low, bobbling effort from Rankin shaved the outside of the post but they left themselves exposed and, in truth, were lucky not to concede again, especially when Steven Davis saw his shot come back off both posts.

Conclusion

The match was pretty even until Russell inexplicably got himself ordered off.  United then finished the half stronger but as soon as the second half was underway, it was pretty clear there was only going to be one winner.

Dundee United manager Peter Houston tinkered with his formation a few times after being reduced to ten men – he experimented, firstly, with a 4-4-1 before moving to a 4-3-2-0 at the start of the second half and finally with a 4-3-1-1 – but couldn’t prevent his side from conceding numerous chances.

Rangers were far more direct and attacking than they have been in their previous away matches this season, especially after going ahead.  In the matches versus St. Johnstone and Inverness, the defending champions have resorted to a counter-attacking approach after taking the lead.  Today, perhaps due to the fact their opponents were down to ten men, they continued to attack and were unlucky not to increase their margin of victory.

Can Celtic stick with the same system without Izaguirre?

Last season, Neil Lennon favoured a lopsided 4-4-2 with Kris Commons pushed ahead of what were essentially three central midfielders.  Either Scott Brown or Joe Ledley would inhabit a more reserved and tucked in role on the opposite flank to Commons.  Moreover, Commons would look to drift inside and occupy the space between the opposition defence and midfield.

The narrow nature of the Celtic midfield was compensated for by the advancement of marauding full-backs, Mark Wilson and Emilio Izaguirre.  At one point last season, both would push up the pitch as much as possible – the 2-2 draw in the Scottish Cup at Ibrox last season is a prime example, even if the initial formation in that match differed from the lopsided 4-4-2 – but towards the end of the season, Wilson’s impetus from right-back dissipated somewhat.

4-4-2, and three-band formations more generally, have gone out of fashion with top sides in the past decade, with many clubs now favouring 4-2-3-1, 4-2-1-3 and the like.  The position of Commons, along with the front two dovetailing in Lennon’s 4-4-2, gives the formation an implicit fourth band.

This particular deployment of 4-4-2 is nothing new.  Kenny Dalglish employed something similar during his first spell as Liverpool manager, and again when manager of Celtic for a brief spell.  As pointed out in the embedded article, fielding two out-and-out wingers in a 4-4-2 can be a risky strategy and Lennon himself has resisted such a move on all but a few occasions.

The system has been effective for a few reasons.  Firstly, it permits three central midfielders in the line up and, given the quality that Celtic possess in that area of the pitch, allows them to dominate most midfield duos and trios they come up against.

Now with the full-backs pushing on to offer width and Commons given free rein to drift ahead of the midfield, the system permits Lennon to field a strike partnership.

In an article spelling out the demise of the classic goalpoacher, Jonathan Wilson points out that due to the rise of lone-striker systems, top strikers are now expected to blend classic strike partnerships into a hybrid role – be it a Didier Drogba that fuses the target man and finisher roles, or a David Villa that combines the best of the creator and finisher responsibilities.

Unfortunately, in Scottish football there is a dearth of these types of strikers.  Nikica Jelavic is one exception and the reason why Rangers will sometimes line up with a lone striker system.  Garry O’Connor is another who blurs the target man/finisher boundaries but his quality his waned somewhat since his last spell at Easter Road.

It is no surprise then, that given the lack of this type and quality of striker, that some clubs in the SPL still favour a 4-4-2.  David Goodwillie was a further example in Scottish football of a creator-finisher hybrid before his recent transfer to Blackburn Rovers, but his departure has seen Peter Houston move from a lone-striker system to a front pairing of Jon Daly and Johnny Russell (or, more recently, Russell and Lauri Dalla Valle).

Without doubt, Antony Stokes and Gary Hooper are two of the top strikers in the league and are arguably the best partnership.  Their link-up play and mutual understanding have seen them terrorise many an SPL defence.  However, neither is suited to playing as the sole striker.  Instead, Lennon has tended to favour Georgios Samaras when the need to go with one striker arises.

Lennon did experiment with Hooper spearheading a 4-2-3-1 in the recent win over Aberdeen but soon realised its shortcomings due to the personnel at his disposal and quickly switching back to his more familiar 4-4-2.  Stokes looks uncomfortable pushed out wide and the knock-on effect is that Hooper becomes isolated.

To sum up, the main benefit of Lennon’s formation is that it allows for a strike partnership without allowing other sides a man advantage, or else allows Celtic to retain a man advantage, in the centre of midfield.  Further, the personnel at his disposal rules out any lone striker system, although, admittedly, I know very little about new signing Mohamed Bangura.

The success of the formation last season – Celtic didn’t win the SPL but they amassed a points total worthy of it most other years, won the Scottish Cup and played some of the best football in the SPL – was partly down to the attacking prowess of Izaguirre and the loss of the Honduran to long-term injury has had an adverse affect on the effectiveness of Lennon’s system.

Lennon has since deployed Charlie Mulgrew at left-back.  The former Aberdeen defender is comfortable on the ball and possesses a great delivery but lacks the pace and drive that Izaguirre provides.  His more reserved approach to that of the Honduran may go some way to explaining why Commons has been less valuable so far this season.  More specifically, there is no one bombing beyond him and giving opposition full-backs a dilemma.

Alternatively, Lennon could move one of his right-backs, most likely Mark Wilson or Adam Matthews, over to the left.  The problem with this approach is that the overlap would thus become less of a danger to opposition defenders since Wilson or Matthews would find themselves having to cross with their weaker foot or else cut inside on to their stronger side.

Either way, Celtic will miss the attacking threat from left-back that Izaguirre provides.  Subsequently, it seems that Celtic are now inviting pressure upon themselves down the flanks.  Tic_Tac_Tic reports that the Dundee United full-backs took advantage of the space afforded to them by the Celtic midfield, which left Wilson and Mulgrew exposed.

Either Celtic need to switch to a formation that allows more width from midfield or else look to Adam Matthews or Cha Du-Ri to provide from the right what Izaguirre managed from the left last season.  Cha didn’t exactly inspire in the recent win over St. Mirren and although Matthews comes with glowing reports from south of the border, he is still a teenager and has only started two competitive matches this season.

Wilson, the other option at right-back, has fallen out of favour at Celtic Park recently and, as mentioned earlier, doesn’t get forward as much as he did at certain points last season.

So what next for Neil Lennon’s Celtic?  Most of their performances this season have been uninspiring and it appears that their formation has lost much of its effectiveness which, it is argued here, is largely down to the loss of Izaguirre and its knock-on effects.

As I write, however, it is transfer deadline day.  Celtic could recruit a left-back before the day is out, even if the signing of Dundee United’s Paul Dixon now seems unlikely.  If Lennon fails in his bid to bring in an attacking left-back, he will have to tinker with his formation in order to compensate for the loss of the width and drive that Izaguirre provided from that position last season.

Or perhaps Bangura will be the man that allows him to deploy a lone striker system and introduce two wingers to his starting line up.