On the Precipice

Much has been made of Danny Lennon’s record since he led St Mirren to their first ever League Cup triumph in March earlier this year. The statistics surrounding the run since then have been done to death, so I won’t bore you with those. Instead, we will take a look into some of the reasons why so much is going wrong for the Paisley side.

For starters, the squad is weaker than it was six months ago. From that cup winning eleven Ismael Goncalves, Craig Samson and Paul Dummett all left the club during the summer. The team may have found itself in even worse shape had the services of Paul McGowan and Conor Newton not been retained.

David Cornell, who, from his early season form, is a downgrade on Samson in goal. And you don’t need me to tell you just how much weaker the defence is without Dummett. The Welsh Under 21 international excelled at left-back last season, and centre-back when required.

The likes of Dougie Imrie, Sam Parkin, Lewis Guy and Graham Carey, less prominent names, followed, leaving the squad thin just about all over the pitch, particularly in attacking areas. Jake Caprice and Stéphane Bahoken increase the options but it is far too early in their St Mirren careers to assess their potential impact.

Another new signing, Gary Harkins, seemed a good addition to the squad in theory. In practice Danny Lennon has failed to get the best out of the former Dundee playmaker. When stationed behind Steven Thompson in attack - who, it must be stated, has scored only once in his last sixteen league matches - their partnership lacks pace. Experimentation with Harkins in one or two other positions has also done little to inspire.

Perhaps it all could have been different for St Mirren had referee Kevin Clancy not unjustly awarded Inverness Caledonian Thistle a penalty when the ball struck David van Zanten’s arm on the opening day. Any hopes of salvaging a point were then doomed within seconds when some cataclysmic ball retention saw them concede directly from the restart.

Within another ten minutes it was three. They have failed to recover since.

A draw at home to Kilmarnock, their sole point thus far, was followed by another thumping in the Highlands. This time Ross County was the ruthless opponent with the lack of confidence and motivation evident in the St Mirren ranks a particular concern.

For the third goal in another 3-0 defeat, Richie Brittain was given the freedom to run around twenty-five yards without anyone tracking him before latching onto a Graham Carey corner. When he strikes to score there are five defenders stationary and within the six-yard box. Additionally, for the second goal, a Brittain penalty, only two St Mirren players are bothered about any potential rebound giving the County captain an easier time following up David Cornell’s save.

Lennon’s side took the lead in their next two fixtures but lost both 2-1. One of these came against Queen of the South in the League Cup. This result all but banished the sole remaining defence of the St Mirren manager: that his side were the holders of the competition.

The most worrying aspect of St Mirren’s situation is the downbeat post-match interviews given by Lennon. Week after week we hear to tired platitudes and clichés from a man who sounds like he lacks fresh ideas or the motivation to find any. Facing the media on Saturday slightly bucked this trend but still done little to convince. Lennon bemoaned a penalty decision – even though it was, eventually, called correctly – then went on to take the positives from the new system they had been working on.

That may not suffice for the St Mirren faithful, who are growing increasingly impatient with their team’s inability to trouble opposition goalkeepers. Just a single shot on target was achieved during Saturday’s defeat. A distinct lack of strikers, apparent since the end of last season when Lewis Guy, Sam Parkin and Ismael Goncalves left the club goes a long way in explaining why St Mirren have scored at least three goals fewer than every other team in the division.

And constantly switching formations and shoehorning players into different positions, hoping that it will just all click into place eventually, is not the way to get the best out of your squad of players.

The season is still young, St Mirren have played a game less than most, the new signings are still to be given their chance and Darren McGregor’s return from long-term injury should improve the side. Unfortunately for Lennon, the responsibility for halting St Mirren’s decline and acting upon these few positives will likely be handed on to one of the current BBC Sportsound regulars within the next few weeks.

The little under three years between Danny Lennon’s appointment as manager and the cup success consisted of a steady progression of the playing squad and an valiant, if not always effective, attempt to instil a purer form of the game. However, one league finish of 8^th, two in the bottom three and another that is heading in the same direction does not bode well. Even for a club with only modest ambitions.

The cup win was a high that was above and beyond the remit of the St Mirren manager even if it masked another terrible league campaign. Since then Danny Lennon has poorly negotiated the transfer window and seems unable to instil a system, or a confidence in his players, to compensate for the squad’s reduced quality. The way things are going at St Mirren Park, he will not see another transfer window to rectify the situation. 

Dunfermline 0 St. Mirren 0

Dunfermline marked their return to the SPL with a 0-0 draw at home to St. Mirren.  Jim McIntyre lined up his side in a 4-4-2 formation with David Graham and Joe Cardle flanking Martin Hardie and Gary Mason in midfield.  Jason Thomson made his debut at right-back after a loan move from Hearts and John Potter and Paul Gallacher both made their second debuts for the club against their most recent previous employers.  Steven McDougall was preferred to Andy Barrowman in attack.

Danny Lennon gave debuts to Steven Thompson, Gary Teale, Jeroen Tesselaar and Nigel Hasselbaink.  Their formation was somewhere between a 4-2-3-1 and 4-3-3 depending on the position of Paul McGowan.  Teale and Hasselbaink began on the wings and switched regularly throughout the match.  Jim Goodwin patrolled the area in front of the back four, allowing the St. Mirren full-backs the licence to push on.

St. Mirren dominate

St. Mirren completely dominated the first half, doing everything right except find the net.  In an interview before the match, Lennon expressed his willingness to instil a passing approach, pointing out that he had signed players who are comfortable in possession.  This approach was evident throughout the match as St. Mirren routinely passed it out form the back and kept possession well.  Hasselbaink, McGowan and Teale were all finding space between the lines and the away side really should have done better with a few early opportunities, especially given how shaky Gallacher was looking in the Dunfermline goal.

To add to their frustration, Thompson passed up the opportunity to open his account with his new club when Gallacher denied him from the spot but despite their inability to score, St. Mirren can be pleased with their overall performance.  David van Zanten and Tesselaar got forward to support attacks and the movement of the front four was superb: Thompson would often pull deep and wide, Hasselbaink would cut in from whatever wing he found himself on, Teale would look to drop deep to collect the ball and McGowan was given something of a free role.

St. Mirren not only dominated possession, they worked so hard off the ball that they stopped Dunfermline from building any momentum.   Hasselbaink and Teale were quick to close down the Dunfermline full-backs, who were rushed into direct passes down the channels, almost all of which were inaccurate.  Other than this, the home side’s only strategy was for the goalkeeper to hit Hardie with long balls.

It was perhaps surprising that Dunfermline manager Jim McIntyre decided to set up in a 4-4-2 formation.  He too articulated his intention to retain a passing approach in an interview during the close season.  However, the fact that he chose to go with two banks of four and two strikers, therefore conceding the midfield battle, suggests that his strategy, initially at least, was to soak up pressure and hopefully catch their opponents on the break.

Their set up in opposition to St. Mirren’s meant that they were met with the classic problem of the 4-4-2 versus a three men central midfield: a man disadvantage in the centre of the pitch.  The fact that neither of Dunfermline’s strikers looked to drop deep and help out only perpetuated the problem.  Further, the presence of Hasselbaink and Teale pushed high up the pitch meant that the Dunfermline full-backs could not advance and help out the midfield as much as they’d like to.

As the half progressed Dunfermline became deeper and deeper as a unit and whenever they regained possession they struggled to find any sort of out-ball.  This, again, was partly due to how hard St. Mirren worked off the ball.

Dunfermline’s second half changes

The second half continued in much the same vein as the first, St. Mirren dominating possession but struggling to find the net.  They came close through efforts from Teale and Thomson early in the second half but struggled to create anything clear-cut after that.

As the half wore on it seemed that St. Mirren were beginning to run out of steam and McIntyre responded by making a few substitutions.  The first change was to bring on Barrowman for the ineffective McDougall, a straight swap which did little to change their set-up.

With around twenty-five minutes remaining, McIntyre then introduced Paul Burns for Graham, which at first seemed like it may have been another straight swap but in actual fact, Burns positioned himself closer to the centre circle than Graham had, and with Jason Thomson now pushing on from right-back, this meant Dunfermline were now effectively matching up 3v3 in the centre of midfield.

McIntyre now sensed that his side could potentially snatch the victory and made his final change, withdrawing Andy Kirk in favour of Ryan Thomson, another holding midfielder.  This meant that Dunfermline were now lined up 4-2-3-1 and this coupled with St. Mirren’s growing lethargy (it was surprising that Lennon made no substitutions at all) meant that Dunfermline enjoyed their best spell of the match.

Conclusion

Dunfermline were completely outplayed in this match until McIntyre switched their formation and matched St. Mirren man-for-man in the centre of the pitch.  It is surprising that this wasn’t noticed and responded to earlier but, as alluded to earlier, perhaps the strategy was to hold a deep defensive line, remain compact and then go for the victory late on.

If so then it is a very risky strategy to say the least.  St. Mirren carved out many opportunities and should have had the lead through Thompson’s penalty kick.

St. Mirren were very unlucky not to win and if last night’s performance is anything to go by then they will likely achieve their highest finish since their return to the SPL.  Lennon has brought some exciting attacking talent to the club.  Thompson looks an excellent signing despite his penalty miss and his height, strength and first touch looks like it will be complimented nicely by the pace (with the exception of Teale) and trickery of the three just behind him.  The real test for St. Mirren will be how their defence and goalkeeper cope against better opposition.

Packing the Midfield

A growing trend during the most recent SPL campaign was for sides to pack the centre of their midfield.  This is not to say that teams are now dropping one of their strikers in favour of another midfielder – this has been evident for many years now – rather, sides appear to be starting matches with a narrow midfield four or five.

To put the same point a different way, when 4-4-2 was the default formation, some sides would diverge and set up more defensively by dropping a striker for an extra midfielder, thus moving to a 4-5-1 which still contained two wide players.  What is increasingly common now, however, is that teams are setting up in such a way that their line up contains four, sometimes five, central midfielders across two bands.

Liberalisation of the offside law

Since the liberalisation of the offside law in 2005, most teams have reverted to holding a deeper defensive line in order to avoid being caught out by the pace of opposing strikers – this is evidenced by the fact that the number of offsides per match has actually fallen significantly in recent years.  Consequently, the effective playing area has been stretched, leading teams to split their midfield into two bands – one attacking and one defensive – hence the re-emergence of four-band formations.  Thus, it is no longer adequate to describe the majority of formations as 4-4-2, 4-5-1 or 4-3-3.  4-4-2 formations are more likely 4-4-1-1 or 4-1-3-2 or something similar; 4-5-1 is more accurately described as, say, 4-2-3-1 (the most popular formation at last year’s World Cup); whereas a more precise notation of 4-3-3 could be either 4-3-1-2 (the default formation in Serie A at the moment) or 4-1-2-3 (the formation used by Barcelona to great effect in recent years).

In each of these formations, there is at least three central midfielders – the 4-4-1-1 contains two holding and one central attacking midfielder, as does the 4-2-3-1, whereas the 4-1-3-2 contains four central midfielders, one deeper-lying than the other three, and the 4-3-2-1 has three holding midfielders and two attacking central midfielders.  Although these formations, many of which are lone-striker systems, may appear prima facie more defensive, there is no reason why any should be considered as such.  Formations are neutral, it is their implementation that gives them positive and negative characteristics.

Therefore, the title Packing the Midfield is intended to convey that some teams are now squeezing four or five central midfielders across two bands, rather than the more traditional use of the phrase which implied a defensive approach, i.e. when a manager decided to drop a striker in favour of another central midfielder with the intention of stifling the midfield area, thus restricting the opportunities of their opponents.

Evidence elsewhere

Before we proceed to the SPL, it is worth pointing out a few examples of formations with four or five central midfielders elsewhere in Europe.  The default 4-3-1-2 in Serie A has already been mentioned but even the sides in Italy that do not adopt this formation, most notably Napoli, still make sure there are plenty bodies in central areas.  Walter Mazzarri’s favoured formation this season has been 3-4-2-1.  Broken down, this formation contains three central defenders; two holding midfielders flanked by two wing-backs; two central attacking midfielders and one striker.  This gives the side four central midfielders.

Evidence can also be found in Spain’s La Liga. Villarreal have lined up 4-2-2-2 for the majority of the previous season under Juan Carlos Garrido, a formation that contains two holding midfielders, two central attacking midfielders and two strikers – an upside-down T-shape – whereas recently-crowned champions Barcelona’s fluid 4-1-2-3 contains one holder, two central attacking midfielders and then Lionel Messi in the false 9 role which involves him dropping into the central attacking midfield area, giving his side, in effect, four central midfielders.

SPL examples

The first example, and perhaps the inspiration for this article, was the formations Celtic manager Neil Lennon deployed during the 2-2 draw at Ibrox in February.  Celtic began the match in a lopsided 4-5-1 with Kris Commons wide left and Scott Brown in his, now familiar, tucked-in right sided role.  The formation, therefore, contained four central midfielders, with one natural winger further forward. 

Rangers dominated the early stages and opened the scoring early on, forcing Lennon to switch things around.  He subsequently moved Commons into a central position just off Gary Hooper in attack, giving Celtic, in effect, five central midfielders.  The four deeper-lying midfielders – now fluid and interchanging – all held central positions and now relied on the full-backs to provide width.  The switch saw Celtic dominate the midfield area.

Similar examples of the above include Rangers’ 5-4-1, which also contained a narrow midfield four, first seen in the 2-2 draw away to Sporting Lisbon in the Europa League - the key difference being that Rangers’ midfield tended to be more rigid.  As well as this, Derek McInnes has been known to line up St. Johnstone with a fluid central midfield four, usually in the form of three out-and-out central midfielders and Liam Craig in a tucked-in left-sided role.

Colin Calderwood has favoured a 4-1-3-2 formation for the most part since taking over as Hibernian manager towards the end of last year.  The 4-1-3-2 involves Victor Palsson sitting just ahead of the defence as a deep-lying playmaker and is usually accompanied by three central midfielders just ahead of him, although there have been one or two occasions where one of the three is naturally a winger and thus has a tendency to drift wide.

In all of the above examples, the sides rely on their full-backs or wing-backs to advance and provide width.  One example that does not necessarily involve pushing the full-backs on can be found with St. Mirren.  Danny Lennon set his side up in a 4-3-2-1, or Christmas tree formation, during a recent trip to Ibrox which contained two attacking midfielders – Paul McGowan and Aaron Mooy- just ahead of three more industrious central midfielders – Paddy Cregg, Jim Goodwin and Steven Thomson – giving them five players in central midfield positions.  The tactic worked for the most part as St. Mirren reduced the home side to few clear-cut chances and in the end narrowly lost the match to a second half Steven Whittaker penalty.

Drifting wingers

Evidence of sides packing the midfield area can also be found with a few clubs who tend to field players as a drifting winger or winger-cum-second-striker, that is, a player who starts in a wide position but who has a tendency, sometimes a compulsion, to drift into central areas.  Perhaps the player in the SPL to play this role to the greatest effect is Steven Naismith of Rangers, although he usually executes this as part of a 4-4-2, giving Rangers a third central midfielder.

We would have to look to Scotland’s recent victory over Wales to find an example of three central midfielders being given extra help in that area by Naismith as a drifting winger.  It is notable that Naismith, and Scotland as a whole, were not nearly as effective when Naismith was deployed as a second striker behind Kenny Miller in the following match against the Republic of Ireland.

Where the drifting wingers have caused sides to have, in effect, more than three central midfield players can be found in the following examples.  Even though we have already discussed Celtic above, the formation mentioned was pretty much a one off as Lennon seemed to favour a two-striker formation most of the time.  This did not detract from his desire to pack the midfield, however.  For the second half of the season, Lennon’s most used formation was a lopsided 4-4-2.  The starting positions included two holders – for example, Joe Ledley and Beram Kayal – with Scott Brown again in a tucked-in, right-sided role and Kris Commons on the left wing and more advanced.  Commons, however, would often drift inside to central areas to collect the ball and link play between the Celtic midfield and attack.  The movement of Commons meant that at many points during matches, Celtic had four players in central midfield positions.

At one point later in the season it appeared that Celtic were moving towards more of a 4-2-2-2, bearing some similarities to that of Villarreal mentioned earlier, with Brown slightly more advanced than usual and Commons pretty much as a central attacking midfielder.  However, this formation didn’t last long and Lennon soon reverted back to the lopsided 4-4-2

Once Danny Swanson and Craig Conway returned from injury, Peter Houston was able to revert his Dundee United side back to his favoured 4-5-1-cum-4-3-3 formation with a V-shaped midfield.  In this set up, Swanson is pretty much given free reign to drift all over the park.  He will occasionally pop up on the opposite wing but spends a lot of time coming inside to occupy the area behind David Goodwillie and sometimes even drops as deep as the centre circle to collect the ball and start off attacks.  It is also worth noting that Houston has also been willing to switch to a Christmas tree formation during matches, in effect, giving his side five central midfielders.

David Obua did something similar in Hearts’ 4-0 defeat to Rangers last month, albeit from a deeper starting position.  It seems from the above that even though the starting positions of most sides suggests X amount of midfielders, a growing number of managers are instructing one of their wide players to either play a tucked in role, in other words a halfway house between wide and a central midfielder, or else as a drifting winger in order to give their side more bodies in the centre of the pitch while retaining some sort of width from midfield.

Reasons

One reason for the loading of central midfield areas has already been alluded to.  This area of the pitch is often of paramount importance as winning the midfield battle is frequently the difference between victory and defeat.  Having an extra man in the centre of midfield gives a side more chance of dominating possession and this is one of the reasons why 4-4-2, in its traditional form, has largely disappeared.  The move away from 4-4-2 to two band formations has ultimately been aided by the liberalisation of the offside law which creates more space in central midfield areas and this, naturally, leads to more players being positioned where there is more space.

Furthermore, squeezing more players into central midfield positions has a positive effect on both the defensive and attacking capabilities of the side.  Not only do the two or three holding midfielders offer their defence more protection, meaning that it is easier to win the ball, but when the ball is eventually won there are more passing options around the player in possession. 

One further reason, related to the point in the previous paragraph, regards the apparent rise of strikerless formations in recent years.  Craig Levein was, perhaps justifiably, lambasted for experimenting with a 4-6-0 in a Euro 2012 qualifier last year although a number of top teams have effectively employed such a tactic, most notably Barcelona, Manchester United and Roma.  One of the thoughts behind this, which is related to our more general point that sides are deploying more central midfielders, is that once the ball is won it is more effective – or from the perspective of the opposition, more difficult – to have midfielders running at and beyond defenders rather than having strikers pushed high up the pitch with their back to goal.

So even though there seems to be little or no examples of a side in the SPL that doesn’t line up in four bands, it seems now that there are many examples of the two midfield bands becoming increasingly populated, be it from fielding more actual central midfielders or else by deploying wingers or wide midfielders who drift inside.  Overall it seems that packing the midfield, more specifically the centre of midfield, is on the rise although not in the traditional sense and not necessarily with the aim of moving towards more negative football.