Rangers 1 Hearts 1

Rangers marked the unfurling of the league flag with a 1-1 at home to Hearts.  In his first competitive match in charge, Ally McCoist brought in Kirk Broadfoot for the suspended David Weir and new-signing Juan Manuel Ortiz for the injured Kyle Lafferty.  He lined up his side in a lopsided 4-4-1-1 formation, with Steven Davis tucking in from the right of midfield and Ortiz as an out-and-out winger on the opposite flank.  Steven Naismith played behind Nikica Jelavic in attack.

Hearts were without the injured duo of Kevin Kyle and Andy Driver and new-signing Jamie Hamill was suspended, meaning that Ryan McGowan came in a right-back.  Other new signings featured in the now familiar 4-2-3-1 preferred by manager Jim Jefferies.  Danny Grainger started at left back after Lee Wallace’s departure to Rangers, Mehdi Taouil began on the right of an attacking midfield three and John Sutton led the line.  After only eight minutes, probably because he set foot in Ibrox, Andy Webster left the field injured and was replaced by Adrian Mrowiec with Eggert Jonsson moving into central defence.

Left-sided battles

The first half can be summed up by two intriguing battles.  Rangers’ formation was such that with Davis tucking in, Steven Whittaker was afforded the space to get forward and support the Rangers attack.  Hearts’ strategy early on, whether pre-planned or else responsive to Whittaker’s forays up the pitch, was to move the ball to David Templeton, exploit the vacated space and get him running at the Rangers defence.  Even when Whittaker remained in position, Templeton often got the better of him, cutting inside the Scotland international time and time again.

Similarly, Rangers looked to get the ball out to Ortiz - with Naismith moving towards the left to link up - but the Spaniard’s runs were thwarted by the impressive McGowan.  Not only did McGowan manage to prevent Ortiz from cutting in on to his stronger foot, he stopped him from getting a cross in on all but one occasion, which came in the second half.

Hearts opened the scoring on sixteen minutes when Obua headed home a Grainger corner.  The big Ugandan started behind Sutton in attack and had perhaps his best game in a Hearts jersey.  He was the main playmaker in the Hearts side, was composed in possession and gave Lee McCulloch and Maurice Edu in the centre of Rangers’ midfield a torrid time.

The goal seemed to instil a sense of urgency in Rangers whose best attacking player up to that point had been Madjid Bougherra, who would look to play one-twos with his teammates and drive at the Hearts defence.  Davis was now coming inside to collect the ball and start off attacks but most of the time Rangers were reduced to hitting Jelavic early with long diagonal balls.

Hearts regained the momentum shortly afterwards and were the much better side in the first half.  One of the main reasons for this was how hard they worked off the ball.  When out of possession, Hearts were quick to get everyone (sometimes with the exception of Sutton) behind the ball and deny Rangers space.  Rangers didn’t get the same level of energy when tracking back from the likes of Naismith and Ortiz.

Second half

Rangers changed their shape at half-time, moving Davis into the centre and Naismith out to the right wing.  Their shape now resembled 4-3-3 and they instantly improved, creating three great chances within five minutes of the restart.

The change in shape gave Rangers the edge for a few reasons.  Firstly, they now matched Hearts 3v3 in the centre of the pitch, which at times was 3v2 to their advantage as Obua was positioned too high up the pitch.  Secondly, Davis was now in his more suited role in the centre of midfield and was able to dictate.

Lastly, and perhaps most significantly, with a player on each wing, Rangers were able to stretch the Hearts defence and take advantage of the space vacated.  A quick switch of play saw Ortiz cut inside McGowan and find Naismith in space but he shot over.

Even though Naismith was now positioned on the right, he retained from last season his tendency to drift into the centre and as a consequence he was involved in most of Rangers’ chances.  As well as missing the chance referred to above, he converted Papac’s cross to equalise on fifty-six minutes.

It was the first time Papac had got into an advanced position in the match and it brought about a goal.  The only other time he got forward, late in the match, he should have scored to secure all three points.

Rangers continued to dominate the second half.  The loss of Templeton early in the second half, due to a head knock sustained in the first half, meant that Hearts lost some of their attacking threat.  Stephen Elliott was brought on to replace him but lacks the drive and ability to take on opponents as effectively.  As a result Hearts struggled to keep possession as well as they had in the first half.  In saying that, Whittaker didn’t get forward much in the second period so it is unclear whether Templeton would have been as effective anyway.

Conclusion

In the end a draw was a fair result with each side dominating one half of the match.  Hearts could have headed into the break more than a goal up and Rangers could have easily converted one or two more of their second half chances.

The first half, dominated by Hearts, was marked by the battles between the respective left-wingers and right-backs.  Templeton took advantage of a poor display from Whittaker and McGowan nullified the threat of Ortiz.  However, a change in formation at half-time saw Rangers create several chances within minutes of the restart and their pressure led to the equaliser.

The most worrying thing from a Rangers point of view is the lack of depth in the squad.  Their bench mostly consisted of younger players and the only substitute used was Gregg Wylde, who came on for Ortiz.  The 20-year-old impressed but the lack of potential match winners in reserve must worry McCoist even at this stage.

Season Preview: How will newly-promoted Dunfermline fare in the SPL?

The upcoming SPL campaign will see Dunfermline Athletic make their return after a four year absence.  The Pars deservedly won promotion after spending the vast majority of the season in the top two positions of the First Division, before hitting a rich vein of form in the closing months.  In the end they finished ten points clear, only lost one home match all season and accumulated more points away from home than anyone else.

As we have seen in the most recent SPL campaign, the promoted side can often catch the other teams unaware and string together an impressive run of results, which, given that there is only one relegation spot, can all but ensure SPL survival going into the second half of the season, even when the side inevitably hits a poor run of form.

The team referred to are of course Inverness Caledonian Thistle who, under Terry Butcher, continued their impressive unbeaten away record, stretching it over an entire calendar year which included coming from two goals behind to draw at Celtic Park.  When this type of scenario unfolds, it is usually down to the side carrying on the form and confidence, harbouring that winning mentality, that got them promoted in the first place.  If Dunfermline can maintain their form from the tail end of last season and carry it into the new season in the same way Inverness managed to, they will be certain to avoid the drop.

Relatedly, something may also be said for sticking to the same system and strategy that brought about promotion.  In recent English Premier League seasons, newly-promoted Burnley, and latterly Blackpool, have shown that sticking to the same enterprising football that earned promotion, as opposed to reverting to a more solid, defensive strategy, can reap rewards.  Both sides were eventually relegated in their maiden season in the Premiership, however, both enjoyed a terrific first half to their respective seasons and did not learn their fate until the final day.  Furthermore, even though both were relegated it should be noted that they had three relegation spots to avoid to the SPL’s one.

The converse, also apparent in recent SPL campaigns, is for a side to struggle initially but then slowly find their feet, hit a decent run of form at a certain point in the season and avoid relegation relatively comfortably.  Despite winning three of their first five matches on their return to the SPL, a run of only one win in thirteen saw Hamilton rooted to the bottom of the table by the end of November in the 2008/09 season.  The Lanarkshire side then embarked on a string of results which saw them win six of their next eight matches which ultimately saved them from the drop.  A similar example can be found with Derek McIness’s St. Johnstone who, in the 2009/10 season, managed only one win in their first nine before hitting a run which saw them lose only three matches between December and March.

Not since Gretna in the 2007/08 season have a side won promotion and then instantly been relegated again.  Since then Hamilton, St. Johnstone and Inverness have all survived their first year in Scotland’s top flight.

So it remains to be seen whether Dunfermline will be able to carry their momentum from last season or whether they will struggle initially, heaping on the pressure to start finding results from somewhere.  One thing is for sure, they already have a huge amount of SPL experience amongst their ranks.  Of last season’s contingent, Andy Kirk, Chris Smith, Austin McCann, Kevin Rutkiewicz, Calum Woods, David Graham and Martin Hardie have all had spells in the top flight, while summer recruits Paul Gallacher and John Potter have a wealth of SPL experience between them.

Tactics

I would love to be able explain theformations and strategies employed by Dunfermline manager Jim McIntyre last season but unfortunately I didn’t get to see them play.  Instead I will extrapolate what I can from the reports from John Maxwell’s wonderful Ross County Tactics website.  

Dunfermline 3 Ross County 2 16.10.10

In this match, Dunfermline lined up 4-4-2 with one winger, Willy Gibson - who has since been sold to Crawley Town – higher up the pitch that the other, Joe Cardle.  The home side were allowed to build from the back but lacked anyone from midfield to drop deep and aid the transitions to attack.  This was due to the two central midfield players, Steven Bell and Gary Mason, pushing on simultaneously which meant that, when out of possession, Ross County’s Michael Gardyne was able to exploit the space left between the lines. 

Dunfermline will not get away with this in the SPL.  All the top sides, and most of the others, have players that play in this area and capitalise on any space found there.  You only have to look at the scoring records of the likes of Steven Naismith, Kris Commons and Rudi Skacel over the past season, as well as the performances of Alexi Eremenko and Danny Swanson for this to become apparent.

Another interesting feature of this match was Andy Kirk’s tendency to drift left during counter attacks, to receive the ball and cross towards the back post, which brought about two goals.  Dunfermline will likely play on the counter attack when away from home, something Inverness Caley Thistle managed to great effect last season, and clever off-the-ball movement will be key to capitalising on these.

Ross County 0 Dunfermline 0 22.02.11
 
Here, Dunfermline did switch to a central-midfield-three with two wingers pushed high against the Ross 
County full-backs, making them rush their passes while in possession.  This approach is certainly effective when executed well although carries major risks.  If the team fails to remain compact, that is, if there is too much of a distance between the defence and attack then this will inevitably leave space, either between defence and midfield or midfield and attack, that can be taken advantage of by the opponents.  However, even if a side is to remain compact, meaning they now are holding a high defensive line, then they will become vulnerable to the pace of some SPL attacks.  Throughout these three reports, John Maxwell refers to the Dunfermline defence as “immobile”.  If this is the case, then they will without doubt be punished by the more pacey attacks in the SPL.

Mason was, for the most part, the spare man in midfield and was afforded time on the ball and allowed to dictate the play.  He and his teammates would form triangles around the County midfield, which allowed the Pars to bypass the home side’s midfield easily.  Gardyne found himself higher up the pitch than the last meeting between the sides, which is strange since playing in his usual central attacking midfield role would have meant he could have kept tabs on Mason and thus negate Dunfermline’s man advantage in the centre of the pitch.

Most sides in the SPL now play with at least three central midfielders, usually in the form of one central attacking midfielder along with two holders, meaning that Mason will likely not be afforded this amount of time on the ball, or else will have his own direct opponent to track.

Ross County 0 Dunfermline 1 29.03.11

For the final meeting between the sides last season, McIntyre again changed his formation, this time to a 4-2-3-1 with two holding midfielders that allowed the attacking four of Liam Buchanan, Martin Hardie, Joe Cardle and Steven McDougall licence to attack.

Of the two holders, one was always spare which was likely due to the presence of Hardie just off Buchanan in attack.  Yet again, the positioning of the two wingers high up the pitch pinned the Ross County full-backs back and caused them to rush when in possession.

Towards the end of the match, with the score still 0-0, McIntyre decided to move to a 4-2-4 and was eventually rewarded when Hardie nodded in the winner in the last minute.  A similar attacking move was made towards the end of the 0-0 draw between the sides earlier in the season, only this time it failed as it negated their man advantage in midfield and, as a result, they struggled to create any more chances.  Make of that what you will: Is McIntyre brave or tactically naïve?

Conclusion

This is obviously a very small sample but it allows us to draw at least some provisional conclusions.  Firstly, of the three matches reported, Dunfermline have employed a different system each time even though Ross County have stuck with more-or-less the same 4-4-1-1 formation in each of the matches.  This suggests tactical flexibility and a willingness to chop and change things.  It is also notable that of the three matches mentioned above, Dunfermline drew once and were victorious in the other two, meaning that, overall, the changes were effective.

One of the few constants that can be identified is that McIntyre likes to play with a winger on each side.  As well as this, the Dunfermline manager admitted that “Passing the ball is the one thing Dunfermline have been renowned for”, adding that “we’ll always try to pass the ball, we don’t bang it long…that won’t change.”  Even if a passing approach is retained, it will be interesting to see whether they stick to having two out-and-out wingers in their side.

It would also appear that the apparent weakness from these matches is the lack of pace at the back.  Maxwell refers to the Dunfermline defence as “immobile” on a few occasions which, coupled with the willingness to press opponents high up the pitch, means that they may face the dilemma of pressing high and being vulnerable to attacks with pace, or else keep a deeper defensive line and leave space between the lines.

All this depends on what approach McIntyre decides to adopt.  He has stressed his willingness to retain a passing approach but this does not necessarily imply an attacking approach.  A deeper defensive line and a counter attacking strategy could potentially serve them well.  Whatever initial approach the SPL new boys adopt, their manager has shown a tactical flexibility that could serve him well in his inaugural season as an SPL manager.

Underdogs refuse to submit, a pitch that makes Fir Park look like a bowling green and the return of the 4-4-2

I remember watching the first round of fixtures at last year’s World Cup and wondering why I had wasted money on backing a first goalscorer or the amount of goals, when clearly the smart money was on the first half finishing 0-0.  Fast forward a year and I am left wondering why I decided against betting altogether and haven’t instead cashed in on this revelation from the last international tournament I found myself engrossed in.  

The matches last night, contested by Uruguay, Peru, Chile and Mexico, both had first half goals, however, the previous four matches were all goalless going into the break.

It has been well documented that managers at international level tend to focus on more on organisation and the like, as opposed to more enterprising or experimental strategies, due to the little time afforded with the squad together.  And who can blame lesser sides from sitting ten men behind the ball in the knowledge that they have no chance of defeating the likes of Brazil or Argentina at their own game?

Results thus far prove that it is logical strategy to implement.  Bolivia, Venezuela and Peru have held the three tournament favourites to draws, whereas Ecuador secured a respectable point against World Cup quarter-finalists Paraguay, and the under-23 sides of Costa Rica and Mexico only narrowly lost out to their respective opponents.

Part of the reason for the sluggish start of the big guns may very well be down to the state of some of the pitches, which have been pretty embarrassing for the organisers despite it being the middle of winter.  The bobbly surface at the Estadio Ciudad de La Plata no doubt contributed to the poor first touch of many of the Brazilians on Sunday night, and the patches of mud at the same arena in the opening match between Bolivia and Argentina has surely left the Motherwell groundsman thinking he is doing a stellar job.

Argentina and Brazil were nowhere near their best over the last few days but both dominated possession and found themselves frustrated for the most part by the dreaded two-banks-of-four-parked-in-front-of-the-goalkeeper formation.  Yes that’s right, the minnows of the South American continent are intent on bringing the supposedly dated formation back to the top level, by means of frustrating the hell out of the top sides with it.  No less than a third of the sides – Bolivia, Venezuela, Ecuador and Paraguay – employed a variant of 4-4-2 and only conceded one goal between them.

Of those teams avoiding the innately-gung-ho (according to most UK pundits anyway) 4-4-2, the most interesting feature was perhaps the amount of defensive midfielders deployed.  Argentina started with a midfield three of Javier Mascherano – although he played as deep as a centre-back at times – Ever Banega and Esteban Cambiasso, before withdrawing the latter in favour of Angel di Maria and moving to a 4-2-3-1.  It could still even be argued whether the ‘2’ was necessary here given that the Argentine full-backs failed to provide much attacking impetus.

Brazil began the tournament with Ramires in more of a holding role, as opposed to his more familiar shuttling role, alongside Lucas Leiva.  It wasn’t so much the positioning of the Chelsea midfielder as his tendency to sit deep.  He did burst forward on occasions but was notable more for his breaking up of Venezuela’s increasingly frequent forays into the Brazilian half.  Perhaps Elano, who was used as a tucked-in right-sided midfielder at the last World Cup, albeit in a different formation, would have been a better option.

As well as this, Uruguay decided that two holders were required to face up to an injury-stricken Peru and Chile manager Claudio Borghi sent out Arturo Vidal as a defensive midfielder alongside Gary Medel, ignoring the fact that he has scored fourteen goals from a more advanced position for Leverkusen in the Bundesliga over the past season.  Despite scoring the winning goal, Vidal looked sluggish and almost uninterested in a more defensive role, surrendering possession cheaply on a few occasions.

Both Borghi and Argentina manager Sergio Batista saw their sides improve after withdrawing one of their defensive midfielders in favour of someone more attacking – Chile dropped Alexi Sanchez from attack into midfield where he had much more of an influence and moved Vidal to the left leaving only Medel holding.  Even though Chile’s goals came from set-pieces, they looked more dangerous and could have added more towards the end of the match.

Tim Vickery has argued that the climate, the state of the pitches and the quality possessed by some of the lesser sides mean that we are in for a “tight and dramatic” tournament.  Added to this that a remarkable eight of the twelve sides currently competing will make the next round and you get the feeling that ‘all to play for’ will be the most-used cliché by Craig Burley over the next week.

The upshot is of course that there will be very few, if not zero, dead rubbers going into the final round of group fixtures.  And it may just work to the advantage of the superior sides.  An opening day disaster fails to pile on as much pressure as it would in a World Cup and it means that there is scope for tinkering with tactics or else persisting in the hope that the players peak and everything clicks into place at the right time.

An unspectacular start in the group stages can sometimes be followed by blistering and, therefore, tournament winning form in the knockout phase.  Perhaps now is the time for sides like Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay to sort out their inadequacies in time for when it really matters.

Or maybe they just need to wait until the final nail is put into the coffin of the dreaded 4-4-2.

*For more tactical analysis of the Copa America please check out Zonal Marking and Holding Midfield, and for a daily podcast check out this effort at the website of the Independent.

Packing the Midfield

A growing trend during the most recent SPL campaign was for sides to pack the centre of their midfield.  This is not to say that teams are now dropping one of their strikers in favour of another midfielder – this has been evident for many years now – rather, sides appear to be starting matches with a narrow midfield four or five.

To put the same point a different way, when 4-4-2 was the default formation, some sides would diverge and set up more defensively by dropping a striker for an extra midfielder, thus moving to a 4-5-1 which still contained two wide players.  What is increasingly common now, however, is that teams are setting up in such a way that their line up contains four, sometimes five, central midfielders across two bands.

Liberalisation of the offside law

Since the liberalisation of the offside law in 2005, most teams have reverted to holding a deeper defensive line in order to avoid being caught out by the pace of opposing strikers – this is evidenced by the fact that the number of offsides per match has actually fallen significantly in recent years.  Consequently, the effective playing area has been stretched, leading teams to split their midfield into two bands – one attacking and one defensive – hence the re-emergence of four-band formations.  Thus, it is no longer adequate to describe the majority of formations as 4-4-2, 4-5-1 or 4-3-3.  4-4-2 formations are more likely 4-4-1-1 or 4-1-3-2 or something similar; 4-5-1 is more accurately described as, say, 4-2-3-1 (the most popular formation at last year’s World Cup); whereas a more precise notation of 4-3-3 could be either 4-3-1-2 (the default formation in Serie A at the moment) or 4-1-2-3 (the formation used by Barcelona to great effect in recent years).

In each of these formations, there is at least three central midfielders – the 4-4-1-1 contains two holding and one central attacking midfielder, as does the 4-2-3-1, whereas the 4-1-3-2 contains four central midfielders, one deeper-lying than the other three, and the 4-3-2-1 has three holding midfielders and two attacking central midfielders.  Although these formations, many of which are lone-striker systems, may appear prima facie more defensive, there is no reason why any should be considered as such.  Formations are neutral, it is their implementation that gives them positive and negative characteristics.

Therefore, the title Packing the Midfield is intended to convey that some teams are now squeezing four or five central midfielders across two bands, rather than the more traditional use of the phrase which implied a defensive approach, i.e. when a manager decided to drop a striker in favour of another central midfielder with the intention of stifling the midfield area, thus restricting the opportunities of their opponents.

Evidence elsewhere

Before we proceed to the SPL, it is worth pointing out a few examples of formations with four or five central midfielders elsewhere in Europe.  The default 4-3-1-2 in Serie A has already been mentioned but even the sides in Italy that do not adopt this formation, most notably Napoli, still make sure there are plenty bodies in central areas.  Walter Mazzarri’s favoured formation this season has been 3-4-2-1.  Broken down, this formation contains three central defenders; two holding midfielders flanked by two wing-backs; two central attacking midfielders and one striker.  This gives the side four central midfielders.

Evidence can also be found in Spain’s La Liga. Villarreal have lined up 4-2-2-2 for the majority of the previous season under Juan Carlos Garrido, a formation that contains two holding midfielders, two central attacking midfielders and two strikers – an upside-down T-shape – whereas recently-crowned champions Barcelona’s fluid 4-1-2-3 contains one holder, two central attacking midfielders and then Lionel Messi in the false 9 role which involves him dropping into the central attacking midfield area, giving his side, in effect, four central midfielders.

SPL examples

The first example, and perhaps the inspiration for this article, was the formations Celtic manager Neil Lennon deployed during the 2-2 draw at Ibrox in February.  Celtic began the match in a lopsided 4-5-1 with Kris Commons wide left and Scott Brown in his, now familiar, tucked-in right sided role.  The formation, therefore, contained four central midfielders, with one natural winger further forward. 

Rangers dominated the early stages and opened the scoring early on, forcing Lennon to switch things around.  He subsequently moved Commons into a central position just off Gary Hooper in attack, giving Celtic, in effect, five central midfielders.  The four deeper-lying midfielders – now fluid and interchanging – all held central positions and now relied on the full-backs to provide width.  The switch saw Celtic dominate the midfield area.

Similar examples of the above include Rangers’ 5-4-1, which also contained a narrow midfield four, first seen in the 2-2 draw away to Sporting Lisbon in the Europa League - the key difference being that Rangers’ midfield tended to be more rigid.  As well as this, Derek McInnes has been known to line up St. Johnstone with a fluid central midfield four, usually in the form of three out-and-out central midfielders and Liam Craig in a tucked-in left-sided role.

Colin Calderwood has favoured a 4-1-3-2 formation for the most part since taking over as Hibernian manager towards the end of last year.  The 4-1-3-2 involves Victor Palsson sitting just ahead of the defence as a deep-lying playmaker and is usually accompanied by three central midfielders just ahead of him, although there have been one or two occasions where one of the three is naturally a winger and thus has a tendency to drift wide.

In all of the above examples, the sides rely on their full-backs or wing-backs to advance and provide width.  One example that does not necessarily involve pushing the full-backs on can be found with St. Mirren.  Danny Lennon set his side up in a 4-3-2-1, or Christmas tree formation, during a recent trip to Ibrox which contained two attacking midfielders – Paul McGowan and Aaron Mooy- just ahead of three more industrious central midfielders – Paddy Cregg, Jim Goodwin and Steven Thomson – giving them five players in central midfield positions.  The tactic worked for the most part as St. Mirren reduced the home side to few clear-cut chances and in the end narrowly lost the match to a second half Steven Whittaker penalty.

Drifting wingers

Evidence of sides packing the midfield area can also be found with a few clubs who tend to field players as a drifting winger or winger-cum-second-striker, that is, a player who starts in a wide position but who has a tendency, sometimes a compulsion, to drift into central areas.  Perhaps the player in the SPL to play this role to the greatest effect is Steven Naismith of Rangers, although he usually executes this as part of a 4-4-2, giving Rangers a third central midfielder.

We would have to look to Scotland’s recent victory over Wales to find an example of three central midfielders being given extra help in that area by Naismith as a drifting winger.  It is notable that Naismith, and Scotland as a whole, were not nearly as effective when Naismith was deployed as a second striker behind Kenny Miller in the following match against the Republic of Ireland.

Where the drifting wingers have caused sides to have, in effect, more than three central midfield players can be found in the following examples.  Even though we have already discussed Celtic above, the formation mentioned was pretty much a one off as Lennon seemed to favour a two-striker formation most of the time.  This did not detract from his desire to pack the midfield, however.  For the second half of the season, Lennon’s most used formation was a lopsided 4-4-2.  The starting positions included two holders – for example, Joe Ledley and Beram Kayal – with Scott Brown again in a tucked-in, right-sided role and Kris Commons on the left wing and more advanced.  Commons, however, would often drift inside to central areas to collect the ball and link play between the Celtic midfield and attack.  The movement of Commons meant that at many points during matches, Celtic had four players in central midfield positions.

At one point later in the season it appeared that Celtic were moving towards more of a 4-2-2-2, bearing some similarities to that of Villarreal mentioned earlier, with Brown slightly more advanced than usual and Commons pretty much as a central attacking midfielder.  However, this formation didn’t last long and Lennon soon reverted back to the lopsided 4-4-2

Once Danny Swanson and Craig Conway returned from injury, Peter Houston was able to revert his Dundee United side back to his favoured 4-5-1-cum-4-3-3 formation with a V-shaped midfield.  In this set up, Swanson is pretty much given free reign to drift all over the park.  He will occasionally pop up on the opposite wing but spends a lot of time coming inside to occupy the area behind David Goodwillie and sometimes even drops as deep as the centre circle to collect the ball and start off attacks.  It is also worth noting that Houston has also been willing to switch to a Christmas tree formation during matches, in effect, giving his side five central midfielders.

David Obua did something similar in Hearts’ 4-0 defeat to Rangers last month, albeit from a deeper starting position.  It seems from the above that even though the starting positions of most sides suggests X amount of midfielders, a growing number of managers are instructing one of their wide players to either play a tucked in role, in other words a halfway house between wide and a central midfielder, or else as a drifting winger in order to give their side more bodies in the centre of the pitch while retaining some sort of width from midfield.

Reasons

One reason for the loading of central midfield areas has already been alluded to.  This area of the pitch is often of paramount importance as winning the midfield battle is frequently the difference between victory and defeat.  Having an extra man in the centre of midfield gives a side more chance of dominating possession and this is one of the reasons why 4-4-2, in its traditional form, has largely disappeared.  The move away from 4-4-2 to two band formations has ultimately been aided by the liberalisation of the offside law which creates more space in central midfield areas and this, naturally, leads to more players being positioned where there is more space.

Furthermore, squeezing more players into central midfield positions has a positive effect on both the defensive and attacking capabilities of the side.  Not only do the two or three holding midfielders offer their defence more protection, meaning that it is easier to win the ball, but when the ball is eventually won there are more passing options around the player in possession. 

One further reason, related to the point in the previous paragraph, regards the apparent rise of strikerless formations in recent years.  Craig Levein was, perhaps justifiably, lambasted for experimenting with a 4-6-0 in a Euro 2012 qualifier last year although a number of top teams have effectively employed such a tactic, most notably Barcelona, Manchester United and Roma.  One of the thoughts behind this, which is related to our more general point that sides are deploying more central midfielders, is that once the ball is won it is more effective – or from the perspective of the opposition, more difficult – to have midfielders running at and beyond defenders rather than having strikers pushed high up the pitch with their back to goal.

So even though there seems to be little or no examples of a side in the SPL that doesn’t line up in four bands, it seems now that there are many examples of the two midfield bands becoming increasingly populated, be it from fielding more actual central midfielders or else by deploying wingers or wide midfielders who drift inside.  Overall it seems that packing the midfield, more specifically the centre of midfield, is on the rise although not in the traditional sense and not necessarily with the aim of moving towards more negative football.